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Abstract
Programmes that provide direct rewards in exchange for
environmental services offer theoretical advantages over
other conservation mechanisms, but also pose a number of
challenges, including determining who should benefit and
how incentives should be structured when the environmental
services are tied to state or community owned land. Case
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studies from Ecuador and Indonesia highlight key land tenure
issues and lessons for those planning Rewards for
Environmental Services (RES) projects.
Introduction 
The objective of RES schemes is to provide sufficient rewards
to local owners or stewards so that they supply specified
environmental outcomes. Typically, this increased supply is
linked to a change in the environmental manager’s land-use
practices. The design of a RES programme therefore requires
careful consideration as to who owns and manages the land.
Approximately 80% of the world’s forests are state-owned
according to national law (White and Martin 2002). However,
in many of these forests indigenous and other community
groups are actively managing the resource (Agrawal et al.
2008). Decentralisation is rapidly increasing the management
responsibilities granted to these community groups. Some
nations are taking more proactive steps, reforming land laws
to recognise private community-based property rights. Often
such reform is largely on paper or responsibility is shifted
without transferral of rights. Thus, many globally significant
environmental services come from forested land managed
and/or customarily owned by local communities, but in most
of these places informal or weak property rights are the
norm. In this paper, we discuss RES projects occurring in two
such areas. 
Ecuador
In northwestern Ecuador, the Gran Reserva Chachi (Figure 1)
— established through direct economic incentives for
biodiversity conservation — comprises a 7200 hectare
community-managed protected reserve and an 11,500
hectare multiple-use area. The reserve lies in the Tumbes-
Chocó-Magdalena Biodiversity Hotspot, and faces pressures
from timber companies and the expansion of oil palm
plantations. Heavy extraction threatens biodiversity and
provides little economic benefit to the local communities.
In 2004, in an effort to provide communities with alternative
livelihood options and to maintain the integrity of the
environmental services, GTZ1 and Conservation International
approached three communities, comprising approximately
300 households, to discuss creating a biodiversity reserve.
The idea was to provide economic incentives for biodiversity
conservation that were competitive with other land use
alternatives. After a year of consultation and participatory
planning with local communities, a contract was agreed that
established a biodiversity reserve in exchange for payments
of US $5 per hectare per year.
Historically, the Chachi people have suffered territorial
displacement and had only recently acquired formal
communal land titles via a lengthy and sometimes contentious
effort funded by USAID/Ecuador (Project SUBIR2). SUBIR was
critical in providing the financial and technical resources
necessary to clarify and title land (Morales Feijóo 2002). This
RES project could not have been implemented if community
land titles had not been issued, since a number of overlapping
land claims existed in the region. Thus, clarification of land
boundaries through formal titling helped legitimise the
establishment of the biodiversity reserve. Major steps taken by
SUBIR to clarify land tenure included community
consultations, capacity building, and boundary mapping using
geographical positioning systems. This was done in
collaboration with the state land-titling agency. 
However, formal land titles alone were insufficient. Training
community members in land rights and enforcement was
necessary to increase their ability to enforce property rights
and exclude encroachers. Since the establishment of the
reserve, illegal takings by logging companies and their
intermediaries have declined. Yet, as in many remote
forested regions, the reach of the state is limited, and even
formally titled land is vulnerable to incursions. Thus, when
contesting land claims arise, the legal apparatus to deal with
them is missing or inadequate. 
This gap in enforcement has been a critical issue in the Gran
Reserva Chachi where external threats can be violent. The
Chachi Federation of Esmeraldas, GTZ and Conservation
International are therefore working together to support legal
actions when land encroachment occurs. This has been a
costly process and will likely continue to be a necessary
investment. As a more permanent solution, the partners in
this RES project are strengthening relationships with legal
agencies in the area to facilitate the resolution of these
types of land tenure conflict. 
The Gran Reserva Chachi case study reveals that RES can be
implemented in marginalised communal lands, provided
investments are made in titling land, in granting legal
support to defend communal titles, and building local
capacity to negotiate and monitor outcomes. While the
impacts of this programme on environmental outcomes or
welfare have not been fully evaluated, a notable sign of
success is that one of the participating communities recently
petitioned to expand the amount of protected forest in order
to gain more income for local education. In addition,
adjacent communities have requested similar RES projects
in their areas. Based on this pilot experience, in September
2008 Ecuador’s Ministry of Environment launched a nation-
1 German Technical Corporation
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Figure 1: Gran Reserva Chachi, Ecuador
helped an additional 18 farmer groups obtain their Hutan
Kemasyarakatan permits. Each group has about 40 farmers.
RUPES aids farmer groups in participatory mapping,
developing forest management plans, and establishing tree
nurseries. Conditional permits now account for about 70% of
the protected forest. RUPES offers an example where
granting conditional land permits can act as the “reward” for
forest management and protection in the watershed. In
essence, this project allows the state to maintain permanent
ownership of the land while granting farmer groups
temporary but secure use rights for land management. 
The uncertain tenure situation in Sumberjaya is similar to
many other areas where people have migrated to forests for
political, economic or environmental reasons. Obtaining even
temporary permits represents a major milestone for the
farmers in Sumberjaya, since they have no customary claims
to land and had recently faced eviction from these areas. An
evaluation of the impacts on farmer groups found that
incomes had increased by almost 30%, mostly because
farmers no longer have to pay bribes to prevent eviction
(Pender et al. 2008). Moreover, deforestation rates have
slowed within the protected forests where farmer groups
have Hutan Kemasyarakatan permits (Ekadinata et al. 2007).
Thus, the Sumberjaya project shows that conditional land
tenure can be used as a reward for improved environmental
service management, while simultaneously improving the
livelihoods of people who lack legal claims to land. 
Discussion
Communities provide environmental services under a variety
of tenure systems, thereby creating a number of contexts
under which a RES programme might need to operate. The
case studies above illustrate two common collective tenure
arrangements in developing countries: formal ownership
titles without strong legal institutions and no formal
ownership or user rights. A third context would be where
formal user rights exist without ownership, for example the
ejido system in Mexico. In the case from Ecuador, conflicts
over land tenure are a serious obstacle to achieving RES
outcomes. These conflicts are partly due to the fact that RES
adds value to land, thus heightening the costs to property
owners of land encroachment. In Indonesia the RES concept
is serving to alleviate land contestations by establishing
contracts between resource owners (the State) and resource
users (local communities). Both cases serve to illustrate that
the success of a RES project depends on correctly defining
the environmental service provider — physically as well as
legally — and bestowing rights  accordingly. 
Conclusion
Indigenous groups and communities inhabit the majority of
remaining forests most important for environmental services,
and many manage that land as common property. This is
especially true in remote biodiverse forests. Our review of
the RES projects in Ecuador and Indonesia highlights the
following key lessons for designing and implementing RES in
collective land tenure regimes: 
• Clarification of land ownership is critical to RES projects
since RES may increase the value of land and therefore
heighten conflict.
• RES must work with national and local governments to
legally recognise and support customary land claims so
that local communities are not alienated through these
projects.
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wide RES programme under the name “Socio Bosque” to
protect forests. It has announced that the Gran Reserva
Chachi is a high priority for this programme, which means
that incentives are likely to increase substantially, as are
contract periods within the reserve. 
Indonesia
The Sumberjaya watershed in northern Lampung Province
(Figure 2) is a rural, hilly area with approximately 90,000
inhabitants, more than half of whom transmigrated from
other parts of the country. The watershed provides relatively
fertile soils for coffee and rice cultivation and important
watershed services such as sediment regulation, which
ensures the functionality of a downstream hydroelectric
plant. In 1990, the government designated one-third of the
watershed as protected forest, leading to the current land
mosaic of national park, protected forest, and privately
owned land. 
Subsequent conflicts between migrants farming in the
watershed and the Forestry Service eventually led to a series
of evictions. Beginning in 1998, political reformation in
Indonesia resulted in reassessment of these types of evictions
and the creation of a social forestry scheme — Hutan
Kemasyarakatan. Under Hutan Kemasyarakatan, groups of
farmers can apply to the Forestry Service for a five year
permit to manage land inside protected forests. To receive a
permit in the Sumberjaya watershed, farmer groups must
commit to plant trees in their coffee agroforestry plots and
to stop deforestation of existing forests. After the initial five
years, a farmer group can apply to extend their permit for an
additional 35 years. 
As of 2004, only five farmer groups had obtained Hutan
Kemasyarakatan permits in Sumberjaya. The process of
obtaining and managing permits has proven slow and costly
— taking up to four years to obtain the permit and costing as
much as US $55 per household, which is about half the
average annual income for farm households (Arifin 2005).
This cost includes time spent coordinating with other
farmers, developing the management plan, applying to the
Forestry Service, and monitoring and enforcement activities.  
The Rewarding Upland People for Environmental Services
(RUPES) project in Sumberjaya started in 2004 and has
Figure 2: Northern Lampung, Indonesia
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• Where customary land claims do not exist, RES projects
must find creative solutions to avoid excluding resident
communities. Access to temporary tenure arrangement
and management contracts are possible.
• Incursions and illicit activities may persist regardless of
whether land boundaries have been clarified or formal
land titles exist. Thus, RES schemes should budget for
institutional strengthening as well as long-term legal
support of the rights of communities to manage and
protect their forests.
Link to the full article here: www.nelson.wisc.edu/
ltc_orig/publications/!ltcbrief9-res_and_land_tenure.pdf 
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